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In this paper, we study the unconditional security of the so-called measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution (MDIQKD) with the basis-dependent flaw in the context of phase encoding schemes. We
propose two schemes for the phase encoding: The first one employs a phase locking technique with the use of
non-phase-randomized coherent pulses, and the second one uses conversion of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) phase encoding pulses into polarization modes. We prove the unconditional security of these schemes and
we also simulate the key generation rate based on simple device models that accommodate imperfections. Our
simulation results show the feasibility of these schemes with current technologies and highlight the importance of
the state preparation with good fidelity between the density matrices in the two bases. Since the basis-dependent
flaw is a problem not only for MDIQKD but also for standard quantum key distribution (QKD), our work
highlights the importance of an accurate signal source in practical QKD systems.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.85.042307 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is often said to be
unconditionally secure [1–3]. More precisely, QKD can be
proven to be secure against any eavesdropping given that the
users’ (Alice and Bob) devices satisfy some requirements,
which often include mathematical characterization of users’
devices as well as the assumption that there is no side channel.
This means that no one can break the mathematical model
of QKD, however, in practice, it is very difficult for practical
devices to meet the requirements, leading to the breakage of
the security of practical QKD systems. Actually, some attacks
on QKD have been proposed and demonstrated successfully
against practical QKD systems [4,5].
To combat the practical attacks, some countermeasures [6],
including the device-independent security proof idea [7], have
been proposed. The device-independent security proof is very
interesting from the theoretical viewpoint, however, it cannot
apply to practical QKD systems where loopholes in testing
Bell’s inequality [8] cannot be closed. As for the experimental
countermeasures, battle testing of the practical detection unit
has attracted many researchers’ attentions [5] since the most
successful practical attack so far is to exploit the imperfections
of the detectors.
Recently, a very simple and very promising idea, which is
called a measurement-device-independent QKD (MDIQKD)
has been proposed by Lo, Curty, and Qi [9]. In this scheme,
neither Alice nor Bob performs any measurement, but they
only send out quantum signals to a measurement unit (MU).
MU is a willing participant of the protocol, and MU can
be a network administrator or a relay. However, MU can be
untrusted and completely under the control of the eavesdropper
(Eve). After Alice and Bob send out signals, they wait for MU’s
announcement of whether she has obtained the successful
detection, and proceed to the standard postprocessing of their
sifted data, such as error rate estimation, error correction,
and privacy amplification. The basic idea of MDIQKD is
based on a reversed EPR-based QKD protocol [10], which
is equivalent to EPR-based QKD [11] in the sense of the
security, and MDIQKD is remarkable because it removes all
the potential loopholes of the detectors without sacrificing the
performance of standard QKD since Alice and Bob do not
detect any quantum signals from Eve. Moreover, it is shown
in Ref. [9] that MDIQKD with an infinite number of decoy
states and polarization encoding can cover about twice the
distance of standard decoyed QKD, which is comparable to
EPR-based QKD. The only assumption needed in MDIQKD
is that the preparation of the quantum signal sources by Alice
and Bob is (almost) perfect and carefully characterized. We
remark that the characterization of the signal source should be
easier than that of the detection unit since the characterization
of the detection unit involves the estimation of the response of
the devices to unknown input signals sent from Eve.
With MDIQKD in our hand, we do not need to worry
about imperfections of MU any more, and we should focus
our attention more to the imperfections of signal sources.
One of the important imperfections of the sources is the
basis-dependent flaw that stems from the discrepancy of
the density matrices corresponding to the two bases in
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) states. The security of standard
BB84 with the basis-dependent flaw has been analyzed in
Refs. [12–14] which show that the basis-dependent flaw
decreases the achievable distance. Thus, in order to investigate
the practicality of MDIQKD, we need to generalize the above
works to investigate the security of MDIQKD under the
imperfection. Another problem in MDIQKD is that the first
proposal is based on polarization encoding [9], however, in
some situations where birefringence effect in optical fiber is
highly time dependent, we need to consider MDIQKD with
phase encoding rather than polarization encoding. In this paper,
we study the above issues simultaneously.
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We first propose two schemes of the phase encoding
MDIQKD, one employs phase locking of two separate laser
sources and the other one uses the conversion of phase
encoding into polarization encoding. Then, we prove the
unconditional security of these schemes with basis-dependent
flaw by generalizing the quantum coin idea [12–14]. Based on
the security proof, we simulate the key generation rate with
realistic parameters; especially we employ a simple model to
evaluate the basis-dependent flaw due to the imperfection of
the phase modulators. Our simulation results imply that the
first scheme covers shorter distances and may require less
accuracy of the state preparation, while the second scheme
can cover much longer distances when we can prepare the
state very precisely. We note that in this paper we consider the
most general type of attacks allowed by quantum mechanics
and establish unconditional security for our protocols.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we give a
generic description of MDIQKD protocol, and we propose our
schemes in Secs. III and IV. Then, we prove the unconditional
security of our schemes in Sec. V, and we present some
simulation results of the key generation rate based on realistic
parameters in Sec. VI. Finally, we summarize this paper in
Sec. VII.
II. PROTOCOL
In this section, we introduce MDIQKD protocol whose
description is generic for all the schemes that we will introduce
in the following sections. The MDIQKD protocol runs as
follows.
Step (1). Each of Alice and Bob prepares a signal pulse and
a reference pulse, and each of Alice and Bob applies phase
modulation to the signal pulse, which is randomly chosen from
0, π/2, π , and 3π/2. Here, {0,π} ({π/2,3π/2}) defines the X
(Y ) basis. Alice and Bob send both pulses through quantum
channels to Eve who possesses MU.
Step (2). MU performs some measurement, and announces
whether the measurement outcome is successful or not. It also
broadcasts whether the successful event is the detection of type
0 or type 1 (the two types of successful outcomes correspond
to two specific Bell states [15]).
Step (3). If the measurement outcome is successful, then
Alice and Bob keep their data. Otherwise, they discard the data.
When the outcome is successful, Alice and Bob broadcast their
bases and they keep the data only when the bases match, which
we call sifted key. Depending on the type of the successful
event and the basis that they used, Bob may or may not perform
bit flip on his sifted key.
Step (4). Alice and Bob repeat steps (1)–(3) many times
until they have a large enough number of the sifted key.
Step (5). They sacrifice a portion of the data as the test bits
to estimate the bit error rate and the phase error rate on the
remaining data (code bits).
Step (6). If the estimated bit error and phase error rates are
too high, then they abort the protocol; otherwise they proceed.
Step (7). Alice and Bob agree over a public channel on an
error correcting code and on a hash function depending on the
bit and phase error rate on the code bits. After performing error
correction and privacy amplification, they share the key.
The role of the MU in Eve is to establish a quantum
correlation (i.e., a Bell state) between Alice and Bob to
generate the key. If it can establish the strong correlation,
then Alice and Bob can generate the key, and if it cannot, then
it only results in a high bit error rate to be detected by Alice
and Bob and they abort the protocol. As we will see later,
since Alice and Bob can judge whether they can generate a
key or not by only checking the experimental data as well as
information on the fidelity between the density matrices in
the X basis and Y basis, it does not matter who performs the
measurement nor what kind of measurement is actually done as
long as MU broadcasts whether the measurement outcome
was successful together with the information of whether the
successful outcome is type 0 or type 1.
In the security proof, we assume that MU is totally
under the control of Eve. In practice, however, we should
choose an appropriate measurement that establishes the strong
correlation under the normal operation (i.e., the situation
without Eve who induces the channel losses and noises). In
the following sections, we will propose two phase encoding
MDIQKD schemes.
III. PHASE ENCODING SCHEME I
In this section, we propose an experimental setup for
MDIQKD with a phase encoding scheme, which is depicted
in Fig. 1. This scheme will be proven to be unconditionally
secure (i.e., secure against the most general type of attacks
allowed by quantum mechanics). In this setup, we assume that
the intensity of Alice’s signal (reference) pulse matches with
that of Bob’s signal (reference) pulse when they enter MU. In
order to lock the relative phase, we use strong pulses as the
reference pulses. In the PL unit in the figure, the relative phase
Alice Bob
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FIG. 1. Schematics of an experimental setup for the phase
encoding scheme I. A-S (B-S) and A-R (B-R), respectively, represent
Alice’s (Bob’s) signal and reference pulses. The signal pulses
are phase modulated according to Alice’s and Bob’s choice. OS
represents an optical switch, which allows the reference pulse and
the signal pulse to be transmitted and to be reflected, respectively.
PL represents a unit measuring relative phase of two orthogonal
polarization modes and it outputs the two relative phase information
κ . Then, the phase shift of κ for each polarization mode is applied to
one of the signal pulses, and they will be detected by D0 and D1 after
the interference at the 50:50 beam splitter BS.
042307-2
PHASE ENCODING SCHEMES FOR MEASUREMENT- . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 85, 042307 (2012)
between the two strong pulses is measured in two polarization
modes separately. The measurement result is denoted by κ
(here, the arrow represents two entries that correspond to
the two relative phases). Depending on this information κ ,
appropriate phase modulations for two polarization modes are
applied to the incoming signal pulse from Alice. Then, Alice’s
and Bob’s signal pulses are input into the 50:50 beam splitter
which is followed by two single-photon threshold detectors.
The successful event of type 0 (type 1) in step (2) is defined as
the event where only D0 (D1) clicks. In the case of the type-1
successful detection event, Bob applies bit flip to his sifted key
(we define the phase relationship of BS in such a way that D1
never clicks when the phases of the two input signal coherent
pulses are the same).
Roughly speaking, our scheme performs double BB84
[16] (i.e., each of Alice and Bob is sending signals in the
BB84 states), without phase randomization [14]. Differences
between our scheme and the polarization encoding MDIQKD
scheme include that Alice and Bob do not need to share the
reference frame for the polarization mode, since MU performs
the feed-forward control of the polarization, and our scheme
intrinsically possesses the basis-dependent flaw.
To see how this particular setup establishes the quantum
correlation under the normal operation, it is convenient to
consider an entanglement distribution scheme [17], which
is mathematically equivalent to the actual protocol. For the
simplicity of the discussion, we assume the perfect phase
locking for the moment and we only consider the case where
both of Alice and Bob use the X basis. We skip the discussion
for the Y basis, however, it holds in a similar manner [18].
In this case, the actual protocol is equivalently described as
follows. First, Alice prepares two systems in the following
state, which is a purification of the X-basis density matrix,
|φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0x〉A1|
√
αA〉A2 + |1x〉A1|−
√
αA〉A2),
(1)
and sends the second system to MU through the quantum
channel. Here, |√αA〉A2 and |−√αA〉A2 represent coherent
states that Alice prepares in the actual protocol (αA represents
the mean photon number or intensity), |0x〉 and |1x〉 are eigen-
state of the computational basis (X basis), which is related
with the Y -basis eigenstate through |0y〉 ≡ (i|0x〉 + |1x〉)/
√
2
and |1y〉 ≡ (|0x〉 + i|1x〉)/
√
2. For the later convenience, we
also define Z-basis states as |0z〉 ≡ (|0x〉 + |1x〉)/
√
2 and
|1z〉 ≡ (|0x〉 − |1x〉)/
√
2. Moreover, the subscript of x in
|φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉 represents that Alice is to measure her qubit
along the X basis, the subscript of A in αA refers to the party
who prepares the system, and the superscript (+) represents
the relative phase of the superposition. Similarly, Bob also
prepares two systems in a similar state |φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉, sends the
second system to MU, and performs the X-basis measurement.
Note that the X-basis measurement by Alice and Bob can
be delayed after Eve’s announcement of the successful event
without losing any generalities in the security analysis, and we
assume this delay in what follows.
In order to see the joint state of the qubit pair after
the announcement, note that the beam splitter converts the
joint state |φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉 into the following
state |ζ 〉A1,B1,D0,D1.
|ζ 〉A1,B1,D0,D1 ≡ 12 (|0x〉A1|0x〉B1|
√
2α′〉D0|0〉D1
+ |1x〉A1|1x〉B1|−
√
2α′〉D0|0〉D1
+ |0x〉A1|1x〉B1|0〉D0|
√
2α′〉D1
+ |1x〉A1|0x〉B1|0〉D0|−
√
2α′〉D1). (2)
Here, for the simplicity of the discussion, we assume that
there are no channel losses, we define αA = αB ≡ α′, and
|0〉 represents the vacuum state. Moreover, the subscripts D0
and D1 represent the output ports of the beam splitter. If
detector D0 (D1) detects photons and the other detector D1
(D0) detects the vacuum state [i.e., the type-0 (type-1) event],
it is shown in Appendix A that the joint probability of having
the type-0 (type-1) successful event and Alice and Bob share
the maximally entangled state |+〉 (|−〉) is (1 − e−4α′ )/4.
We note that since |√2α′〉 = |−√2α′〉, Alice and Bob do
not always share this state, and with a joint probability of
(1 − e−2α′ )2/4, they have the type-0 (type-1) successful event
and share the maximally entangled state with the phase error
(i.e., the bit error in the Y basis) as |+〉 (|−〉).
Note that the bit-flip operation in type-1 successful detec-
tion can be equivalently performed by π rotation around the
Z basis before Bob performs the X-basis measurement. In
other words, π rotation around the Z basis before the X-basis
measurement does not change the statistics of the X-basis
measurement followed by the bit flip. Thanks to this property,
we can conclude that Alice and Bob share |+〉 with the
probability of (1 − e−4α′ )/2 and |+〉 with the probability
of (1 − e−2α′ )2/2 after the rotation. This means that even if
Alice and Bob are given the successful detection event, they
cannot be sure whether they share |+〉 or |+〉, however, if
they choose a small enough α, then the phase error rate (the
rate of the state |+〉 in the qubit pairs remaining after the
successful events or equivalently, the rate of the Y -basis bit
error among all the shared qubit pairs) becomes small and
they can generate a pure state |+〉 by phase error correction,
which is equivalently done by privacy amplification in the
actual protocol [3]. We note that the above discussion is valid
only for the case without noises and losses, and we will prove
the security against the most general attack in Sec. V without
relying on the argument given in this section.
We remark that in the phase encoding scheme I, it is
important that Alice and Bob know quite well about the four
states that they prepare. This may be accomplished by using
state tomography with homodyne measurement involving the
use of the strong reference pulse [19].
IV. PHASE ENCODING SCHEME II
In this section, we propose the second experimental setup
for MDIQKD with a phase encoding scheme. Like scheme I,
this scheme will also be proven to be unconditionally secure.
In this scheme, the coherent pulses that Alice and Bob send out
are exactly the same as those in the standard phase encoding
BB84 (i.e., |ei(ζ+θ)√α〉s |eiζ√α〉r ), where subscripts s and r ,
respectively, denote the signal pulse and the reference pulse,
ζ is a completely random phase, θ is randomly chosen from
{0,π/2,π,3π/2} to encode the information. After entering the
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OS PBS
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V
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FIG. 2. Schematics of an experimental setup of the converter from
phase encoding to polarization encoding. PBS is a polarization beam
splitter, and OS represents an optical switch that routes the reference
pulse and signal pulses to different paths. The “π” performs the
conversion |H 〉 → |V 〉. The circle represents time delay. The italic
characters along the lines represent the polarization state.
MU, each pulse pair is converted from a phase coding signal
to a polarization coding signal by a phase-to-polarization
converter (see details below). We note that thanks to the phase
randomization by ζ , the joint state of the signal pulse and the
reference pulse is a classical mixture of photon number states.
In Fig. 2, we show the schematics of the converter.
This converter performs the phase-to-polarization conversion:
ˆP1|ei(ζ+θ)√α〉s |eiζ√α〉r to (|V 〉 + eiθ |H 〉)/
√
2, where ˆP1 is
a projector that projects the joint system of the signal and
reference pulses to a two-dimensional single-photon subspace
spanned by {|0〉s |1〉r ,|1〉s |0〉r} where 0 and 1 represent the
photon number, and |H 〉 (|V 〉) represents the horizontal
(vertical) polarization state of a single photon. To see how
it works, let us follow the time evolution of the input state.
At the polarization beam splitter (PBS in Fig. 2), the signal
and reference pulses first split into two polarization modes, H
and V, and we throw away the pulses being routed to V mode.
Then, in H mode, the signal pulse and the reference pulse are
routed to different paths by using an optical switch, and we
apply π rotation only to one of the paths to convert H to V. At
this point, we essentially have (|V 〉up + eiθ |H 〉lw)/
√
2, where
the subscripts of “up” and “lw,” respectively, denote the upper
path and the lower path. Finally, these spatial modes up and lw
are combined together by using a polarization beam splitter so
that we have (|V 〉 + eiθ |H 〉)/√2 in the output port depicted
as “OUT.”
In practice, since the birefringence of the quantum channel
can be highly time dependent and the polarization state of the
input pulses to MU may randomly change with time (i.e., the
input polarization state is a completely mixed state), we cannot
deterministically distill a pure polarization state, and thus the
conversion efficiency can never be perfect. In other words, one
may consider the same conversion of the V mode just after
the first polarization beam splitter, however, it is impossible
to combine the resulting polarization pulses from V mode and
the one from H mode into a single mode.
We assume that MU has two converters, one is for the
conversion of Alice’s pulse and the other one is for Bob’s pulse,
and the two output ports “OUT” are connected to exactly the
same Bell measurement unit [8] in the polarization encoding
MDIQKD scheme in Fig. 3 [9]. This Bell measurement
unit consists of a 50:50 beam splitter, two polarization
beam splitters, and four single-photon detectors, which only
distinguishes perfectly two out of the four Bell states of
|−〉 and |−〉. The polarization beam splitters discriminate
between |+〉 ≡ (|H 〉 + |V 〉)/√2 and |−〉 ≡ (|H 〉 − |V 〉)/√2
(note that we choose + and − modes rather than H and V
Alice
A-
S
BS
D0
+
A-
R
Co
nv
B-S
B-R
Conv
PBS PBS
D1
+
D0
-
D1
-
Bob
FIG. 3. Schematics of an experimental setup of MU. A-S (B-S)
and A-R (B-R), respectively, represent Alice’s (Bob’s) signal and
reference pulses, and MU consists of two converters for each
pulse from Alice and Bob (depicted as “Conv”), and the Bell
measurement unit consists of a 50:50 beam splitter (BS) followed
by two polarization beam splitters (PBSs). See the main text for the
explanation.
modes since our computational basis is + and −). Suppose that
a single photon enters both from Alice and Bob. In this case, the
click of D0+ and D0− or D1+ and D1− means the detection of
|−〉, and the click of D0+ and D1− or D0− and D1 + means
the detection of |−〉 (see Fig. 3). In this scheme, since the use
of coherent light induces a nonzero bit error rate in the Y basis
({(|H 〉 + i|V 〉)/√2,(|H 〉 − i|V 〉)/√2} basis), we consider to
generate the key from the {|+〉,|−〉} basis and we use the
data in the Y basis only to estimate the bit error rate in this
basis conditioned on that both of Alice and Bob emit a single
photon, which determines the amount of privacy amplification.
By considering a single-photon polarization input both from
Alice and Bob, one can see that Bob should not apply the
bit flip only when Alice and Bob use the Y basis and − is
detected in MU, and Bob should apply the bit flip in all the other
successful events to share the same bit value. Accordingly, the
bit error in the X basis is given by the successful detection
event conditioned on that Alice and Bob’s polarization are
identical. As for the Y basis, the bit error is − detection
given the orthogonal polarizations or − detection given the
identical polarization.
Assuming a completely random input polarization state,
our converter successfully converts the single-photon pulse
with a probability of 50%. Note in the normal experiment
that the birefringence effect between Alice and the converter
and the one between Bob and the converter are random and
independent, however, it only leads to a fluctuating coincidence
rate of Alice’s and Bob’s signals at the Bell measurement, but
does not affect the QBER. Moreover, the fluctuation increases
the single-photon loss inserted into the Bell measurement.
Especially, the events that the output of the converter for Alice
is the vacuum and the one for Bob is a single photon, and
vice versa would increase compared to the case where we
have no birefringence effect. However, this is not a problem
since the Bell measurement does not output the conclusive
events in these cases unless the dark counting occurs. Thus, the
random and independent polarization fluctuation in the normal
experiment is not a problem, and we will simply assume in our
simulation in Sec. VI B that this fluctuation can be modeled
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just by 50% loss. We emphasize that we do not rely on these
assumptions at all when we prove the security, and our security
proof applies to any channels and MUs.
For the better performance and also for the simplicity of
analysis, we assume the use of an infinite number of decoy
states [20] to estimate the fraction of the probability of a
successful event conditioned on that both Alice and Bob emit
a single photon. One of the differences in our analysis from
the work in Ref. [9] is that we will take into account the
imperfection of Alice’s and Bob’s source (i.e., the decay of the
fidelity between two density matrices in two bases). We also
remark that since the H and V modes are defined locally in MU,
Alice and Bob do not need to share the reference frame for the
polarization mode, which is one of the qualitative differences
from the polarization encoding MIQKD scheme [9].
V. SECURITY PROOF
This section is devoted to the unconditional security proof
(i.e., the security proof against the most general attacks) of our
schemes. Since both of our schemes are based on BB84 and
the basis-dependent flaw in both protocols can be treated in the
same manner, we can prove the security in a unified manner.
If the states sent by Alice and Bob were basis independent
(i.e., the density matrices of the X basis and Y basis were
the same), then the security proof of the original BB84 [1–3]
could directly apply (also see [21] for a bit more detailed
discussion of this proof), however, they are basis dependent in
our case. Fortunately, the security proof of the standard BB84
with a basis-dependent flaw has already been shown to be
secure [12–14], and we generalize this idea to our case where
we have a basis-dependent flaw from both Alice and Bob. In
order to do so, we consider a virtual protocol [12–14,22] that
Alice and Bob get together and the basis choices by Alice
and Bob are made via measurement processes on the so-called
quantum coin. In this virtual protocol of the phase encoding
scheme I, Alice and Bob prepare joint systems in the state [23],
| ′〉≡ 12 (|0z〉E |0z〉B |0z〉A|φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉
+ |0z〉E |0z〉B |1z〉A|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αB〉)〉
+ |1z〉E |1z〉B |0z〉A|φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αB〉)〉
+ |1z〉E |1z〉B |1z〉A|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉).
(3)
Since just replacing the state, for instance, |φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉 →
|φ(+)x (|1〉s |0〉r/
√
2 + |0〉s |1〉r/
√
2)〉, where 1 and 0 in the ket,
respectively, represents the single photon and the vacuum, is
enough to apply the following proof to the phase encoding
scheme II, we discuss only the security of the phase encoding
scheme I in what follows. In Eq. (3), the first system denoted
by E is given to Eve just after the preparation, and it informs
Eve of whether the bases to be used by Alice and Bob match
or not. The second system, denoted by B, is a copy of the
first system and this system is given to Bob who measures this
system with the {|0z〉B,|1z〉B} basis to know whether Alice’s
and Bob’s bases match or not. If his measurement outcome
is |0z〉B (|1z〉B), then he uses the same (the other) basis to be
used by Alice (note that no classical communication is needed
in order for Bob to know Alice’s basis since Alice and Bob
get together). The third system, which is denoted by A and
we call the “quantum coin,” is possessed and to be measured
by Alice along the {|0z〉A,|1z〉A} basis to determine her basis
choice, and the measurement outcome will be sent to Eve after
Eve broadcasts the measurement outcome at MU. Moreover,
all the second systems of |φ(+)x (
√
αA)〉, |φ(+)y (|−i
√
αA〉)〉,
|φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉, and |φ(+)y (|−i
√
αB〉)〉 are sent to Eve. Note
in this formalism that the information, including classical
information and quantum information, available to Eve is the
same as those in the actual protocol, and the generated key
is also the same as the one of the actual protocol since the
statistics of Alice’s and Bob’s raw data is exactly the same as
the one of the actual protocol. Thus, we are allowed to work
on this virtual protocol for the security proof.
The first system given to Eve in Eq. (3) allows her to know
which coherent pulses contain data in the sifted key and she
can postselect only the relevant pulses. Thus, without the loss
of any generalities of the security proof, we can concentrate
only on the postselected version of the state in Eq. (3) as
|〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0z〉A|φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉
+ |1z〉A|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αB〉)〉). (4)
The most important quantity in the proof is the phase error
rate in the code bits. The definition of the phase error rate is the
rate of bit errors along the Y basis in the sifted key if they had
chosen theY basis as the measurement basis when both of them
have sent pulses in the X basis. If Alice and Bob have a good
estimation of this rate as well as the bit error rate in the sifted
key (the bit error rate in the X basis given Alice and Bob have
chosen the X basis for the state preparation), they can perform
hashing in the Y basis and X basis simultaneously [17,24] to
distill pairs of qubits in the state whose fidelity with respect
to the product state of the maximally entangled state |+〉 is
close to 1.
According to the discussion on the universal composability
[26], the key distilled via the X-basis measurement on such a
state is composably secure and moreover exactly the same key
can be generated only by classical means (i.e., error correction
and privacy amplification [3]). Thus, we are left only with the
phase error estimation. For the simplicity of the discussion,
we assume the large number of successful events n so that we
neglect all the statistical fluctuations and we are allowed to
work on a probability rather than the relative frequency.
The quantity we have to estimate is the bit error along
the Y basis, denoted by δ′y , given Alice and Bob send the
|φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)〉 state, which is different from the
experimentally available bit error rate along the Y basis given
Alice and Bob send the |φ(+)y (|−i
√
αA〉)〉|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αB〉)〉
state. Intuitively, if the basis-dependent flaw is very small,
δ′y and δy should be very close since the states are almost
indistinguishable. To make this intuition rigorous, we briefly
review the idea by [13,14] which applies Bloch sphere bound
[27] to the quantum coin. Suppose that we randomly choose the
Z basis or X basis as the measurement basis for each quantum
coin. Let nγz/2 and nγx/2 be the fraction that those quantum
coins result in 1 in the Z-basis and the X-basis measurement,
respectively. What Bloch sphere bound [i.e., Eqs. (13) or (14)
in Ref. [27] or Eq. (A1) in Ref. [14]] tells us in our case is that
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no matter how the correlations among the quantum coins are
and no matter what the state for the quantum coins is, thanks
to the randomly chosen bases, the following inequality holds
with probability exponentially close to 1 in n:
(1 − 2γz)2 + (1 − 2γx)2  1 . (5)
By applying this bound separately to the quantum coins that
are conditional on having phase errors and to those that are
conditional on having no phase error, and furthermore by
combining those inequalities using Bayes’s rule, we have
1 − 2 
√
δyδ′y +
√
(1 − δy)(1 − δ′y). (6)
Here,  is equivalent to the probability that the measurement
outcome of the quantum coin along the X basis is |1x〉 given
the successful event in MU. Note that this probability can be
enhanced by Eve who chooses carefully the pulses, and Eve
could attribute all the loss events to the quantum coins being
in the state |0x〉. Thus, we have an upper bound of  in the
worst-case scenario as
  ini/γsuc , (7)
and
ini ≡ (1 − 〈φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αA〉)〉
× 〈φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)|φ(+)y (|−i
√
αB〉)〉)/2, (8)
where γsuc is the frequency of the successful event.
Note that we have not used the explicit form of |φ(±)x (β)〉
and |φ(±)y (β)〉, where β =
√
αA,−i√αA,√αB,−i√αB , in the
derivation of Eqs. (6)–(8), and the important point is that
the state |φ(±)x (β)〉 and |φ(±)y (β)〉 are the purification of
Alice’s and Bob’s density matrices for both bases. Since
there always exists purification states of ρ(X) and ρ(Y ), which
are, respectively, denoted by |(X)〉 and |(Y )〉, such that
〈(X)|(Y )〉 = F (ρ(X),ρ(Y )) ≡ Tr(|
√
ρ(X)
√
ρ(Y )|), ini can be
rewritten by
ini ≡
[
1 − F (ρ(X)A ,ρ(Y )A )F (ρ(X)B ,ρ(Y )B )]/2, (9)
where ρ(X)A represents Alice’s density matrix of the X basis
and all the other density matrices are defined by the same
manner. Our expression ofini has the product of two fidelities,
while the standard BB84 with the basis-dependent flaw in
Refs. [12–14] has only one fidelity (the fidelity between Alice’s
density matrices in the X and Y bases). The two products may
lead to poor performance of our schemes compared to that of
standard QKD in terms of the achievable distances, however,
our schemes have the huge advantage over the standard QKD
in that there is no side channel in the detectors.
Finally, the key generation rate G, given the X basis, in the
asymptotic limit of large n is given by
G = γ (x)suc (1 − f (δx)h(δx) − h(δ′y)), (10)
where δx is the bit error rate in the X basis, f (δx) is
the inefficiency of the error correcting code, and h(x) ≡
−x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). We can trivially obtain the
key generation rate for the Y basis just by interchanging the
X basis in all the discussions above to the Y basis. We remark
in our security proof that we have assumed nothing about
what kind of measurement MU conducts but that it announces
whether it detects the successful event and the type of the
event (this announcement allows us to calculate γ (x)suc and the
error rates). Thus, MU can be assumed to be totally under
the control of Eve.
VI. SIMULATION OF THE KEY GENERATION RATES
In the following subsections, we show some examples of the
key generation rate of each of our schemes assuming typical
experimental parameters taken from the Gobby-Yuan-Shields
(GYS) experiment [28] unless otherwise stated. Moreover, we
assume that the imperfect phase modulation is the main source
of the decay of the fidelity between the density matrices in two
bases, and we evaluate the effect of this imperfection on the
key generation rate.
A. Phase encoding scheme I
In the phase encoding scheme I, the important quantity for
the security ini can be expressed as
ini = 12 [1 − e−(αA+αB )(cosαA + sinαA)(cosαB + sinαB)].
(11)
Note that this quantity is dependent on the intensity of Alice’s
and Bob’s sources. As we have mentioned in Sec. III, this
quantity may be estimated relatively easily via tomography
involving homodyne measurement.
To simulate the resulting key generation rate, we assume
that the bit error stems from the dark counting as well as
alignment errors due to imperfect phase locking or imperfect
optical components. The alignment error is assumed to be
proportional to the probability of having a correct click
caused only by the optical detection not by the dark counting.
Moreover, we make assumptions that all the detectors have
the same characteristics for the simplicity of the analysis, and
Alice and Bob choose the intensities of the signal lights in such
a way that the intensities of the incoming pulses to MU are
the same. Finally, we assume the quantum inefficiency of the
detectors to be part of the losses in the quantum channels. With
all the assumptions, we may express the resulting experimental
parameters as
γ (x)suc = [pdark + (1 − pdark)(1 − e−2αin )](1 − pdark)
+ (1 − pdark)e−2αinpdark,
γsuc = γ (x)suc + γ (y)suc ,
δx = δy = [eali(1 − pdark)2(1 − e−2αin )
+ (1 − pdark)e−2αinpdark]/γ (x)suc , (12)
αin ≡ αAηA = αBηB,
ηA = ηdet,A10−ξAlA/10,
ηB = ηdet,B10−ξB lB/10.
Here, pdark is the dark count rate of the detector, eali is
the alignment error rate, ηA(ηB) is Alice’s (Bob’s) overall
transmission rate, ηdet,A (ηdet,B) is the quantum efficiency of
Alice’s (Bob’s) detector, ξA(ξB) is Alice’s (Bob’s) channel
transmission rate, and lA (lB) is the distance between Alice
(Bob) and MU. The first term and the second term in δx or δy ,
respectively, represent the alignment error, which is assumed
to be proportional to the probability of having correct bit value
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FIG. 4. The key generation rates of each setting as a function of
the distance between Alice and Bob with the alignment error rate
(eali) of 3.3% and 4.0%. (Dashed line) (a) MU is at Bob’s side (i.e.,
lB = 0). (Solid line) (b) MU is just in the middle between Alice and
Bob. The lines achieving the longer distances correspond to 3.3% of
eali. See also the main text for the explanation.
due to the detection of the light, and errors due to dark counting
(one detector clicks due to the dark counting while the other
one does not).
We take the following parameters from the GYS experiment
[28]: f (δx) = 1.22, pdark = 8.5 × 10−7, ξ = 0.21 (dB/km),
ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.045, and eali = 0.033, and we simulate the
key generation rate as a function of the distance between Alice
and Bob in Fig. 4. In the figure, we consider two settings:
(a) MU is at Bob’s side (i.e., lB = 0), and (b) MU is just in the
middle between Alice and Bob. The reason why we consider
these settings is that the basis-dependent flaw is dependent
on intensities that Alice and Bob employ, and it is not trivial
where we should place MU for the better performance.
Since the MDIQKD polarization encoding scheme without
basis-dependent flaw achieves almost twice the distance
of BB84 [9], we may expect that the setting (b) could
achieve almost twice the distance of BB84 without phase
randomization that achieves about 13 (km) [14] with the same
experimental parameters. The simulation result, however, does
not follow this intuition since we have the basis-dependent flaw
not only from Alice’s side but also from Bob’s side. Thus, the
advantage that we obtain from putting MU between Alice and
Bob is overwhelmed by the double basis-dependent flaw. In
each setting, we have optimized the intensity of the coherent
pulses αA for each distance (see Fig. 5).
In order to explain why the optimal αA is so small, note that
scheme I intrinsically suffers from the basis-dependent flaw
due to Eq. (11). This means that if we use relatively large αA,
then we cannot generate the key due to the flaw. Actually, when
we set αA = 0.1, which is a typical order of the amplitude for
decoy BB84, one can see that the upper bound of the phase
error rate is 1/2 even in the zero distance (i.e., l = 0), and
we have no chance to generate the key with this amplitude.
Thus, Alice and Bob have to reduce the intensities in order to
suppress the basis-dependent flaw. In addition, as the distance
gets larger and the losses get increased, Alice and Bob have to
use weaker pulses since larger losses can be exploited by Eve
to enhance the basis-dependent flaw according to Eq. (7), and
they can reduce the intensities until it reaches the cutoff value
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FIG. 5. Optimal mean photon numbers emitted by Alice’s source
(αA) that outputs Fig. 4 as a function of the distance between Alice
and Bob.
where the detection of the weak pulses is overwhelmed by the
dark counts.
In the above simulation, we have assumed that Alice and
Bob can prepare states very accurately, however, in reality, they
can only prepare approximate states due to the imperfection
of the sources. This imperfection gives more basis-dependent
flaw, and in order to estimate the effect of this imperfection,
we assume that the fidelity between the two actually prepared
density matrices in two bases is approximated by the fidelity
between the following density matrices (see Appendix B for
the detail):
ρ
(Act)
X (α,δ) = (|
√
α〉〈√α| + |−ei|δ|√α〉〈−ei|δ|√α|)/2, (13)
and
ρ
(Act)
Y (α,δ) = (|iei|δ|/2
√
α〉〈iei|δ|/2√α|
+ |−ie−i|δ|/2√α〉〈−ie−i|δ|/2√α|)/2, (14)
where we assume an imperfect phase modulator whose degree
of the phase modulation error is proportional to the target
phase modulation value, and δ represents the imperfection of
the phase modulation that is related with the extinction ratio
ηex as ∣∣∣∣tan δ2
∣∣∣∣
2
= ηex. (15)
In this equation, we assume that the nonzero extinction ratio
is only due to the imperfection of the phase modulators. Since
imperfect phase modulation results in the same effect as the
alignment errors (i.e., the pulses are routed to a wrong output
port), we assume that the alignment error rate is increased with
this imperfection. Thus, in the simulation accommodating the
imperfection of the phase modulation, we replace eali with
eali + 16ηex. Here, we have used a pessimistic assumption
that the effect of the phase modulation becomes 16 times
higher than before since each of Alice and Bob has one phase
modulator and MU has two phase modulators for the phase
shift of two polarization modes [note from Eq. (15) that ηex
is approximately proportional to δ2, thus 4 times degradation
in terms of the accuracy of the phase modulation results in
16 times degradation in terms of the extinction ratio]. We also
remark that in practice, it is more likely that the phase encoding
errors are independent, in which case a factor of 4 will suffice
and the key rate will actually be higher than what is presented
in our paper. On the other hand, we have to use the following
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FIG. 6. The key generation rates of each setting as a function
of the distance between Alice and Bob with a baseline alignment
error rate (eali) of 3.3% and imperfect phase modulators. δ0 = 0.063
represents the typical amount of the phase modulation error, and we
plot the key rate for smaller imperfection of δ0/3 and δ0/5. (Dashed
line) MU is at Bob’s side (i.e., lB = 0). (Solid line) MU is just in the
middle between Alice and Bob.
ini when we consider the security:
ini =
[
1 − F (ρ(Act)X (αA,δ),ρ(Act)Y (αA,δ))
×F (ρ(Act)X (αB,δ),ρ(Act)Y (αB,δ))]/2. (16)
In Figs. 6 and 7, we plot the key generation rate and the
corresponding optimal Alice’s mean photon numbers (αA) as
a function of the distance between Alice and Bob. In the
figures, we define |δ| that satisfies ηex = | tan δ2 |2 = 10−3 as
δ0(∼0.063), where ηex = 10−3 is the typical order of ηex in
some experiments [29]. We have confirmed that we cannot
generate the key when ηex = 10−3. However, we can see in the
figures that if the accuracy of the phase modulation is increased
three times or five times (i.e., δ = δ0/3 and δ = δ0/5), then we
can generate the key. Like the case in Fig. 5, the small optimal
mean photon number can be intuitively understood by the
arguments that we have already made in this section.
In order to investigate the feasibility of the phase encoding
scheme I with the current technologies, we replace pdark =
8.5 × 10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.045, and eali = 0.033 with
pdark = 1.0 × 10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.15 [30], and eali =
0.0075 [9]. We see in Fig. 8 that the key generation is possible
over much longer distances with those parameters assuming
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FIG. 7. Optimal mean photon numbers emitted by Alice’s source
(αA) that outputs Fig. 6 as a function of the distance between Alice
and Bob.
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FIG. 8. The key generation rates of each setting as a function of
the distance between Alice and Bob with the latest parameters such
as eali = 0.0075 with pdark = 1.0 × 10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.15 [30],
and δ0 = 0.063. (Dashed line) MU is at Bob’s side (i.e., lB = 0).
(Solid line) MU is just in the middle between Alice and Bob.
the precise control of the intensities of the laser source. We
also show the corresponding optimal mean photon number αA
in Fig. 9. We note that thanks to the higher quantum efficiency,
the success probability becomes higher, following that Alice
and Bob can use larger mean photon number αA compared to
those in Figs. 7 and 9.
B. Phase encoding scheme II
In the phase encoding scheme II, note that we can generate
the key only from the successful detection event in MU given
both Alice and Bob send out a single-photon since if either
or both Alice and Bob emit more than one photon, then Eve
can employ the so-called photon number splitting attack [31].
Thus, the important quantities to estimate are Q(1,1)x , δ(1,1)y , δx ,
Qx , which, respectively, represent gain in the X basis given
both Alice and Bob emit a single photon, the phase error
rate given Alice and Bob emit a single photon, overall bit
error rate in the X basis, and overall gain in the X basis.
To estimate these quantities stemming from the simultaneous
single-photon emission, we assume the use of an infinite
number of decoy states for the simplicity of analysis [20].
Another important quantity in our study is the fidelity F (1)A
(F (1)B ) between Alice’s (Bob’s) X-basis and Y -basis density
matrices of only a single-photon component, not whole optical
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FIG. 9. Optimal mean photon numbers emitted by Alice’s source
(αA) that outputs Fig. 8 as a function of the distance between Alice
and Bob.
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modes. If this fidelity is given, then we have
(1,1)ini = 12
(
1 − F (1)A F (1)B
)
. (17)
For the simplicity of the discussion, we consider the case
of F (1)A = F (1)B ≡ F (1) in our simulation. The estimation of
the fidelity only in the single-photon part is very important,
however, to the best of our knowledge we do not know any
experiment directly measuring this quantity. This measure-
ment may require photon number resolving detectors and
very accurate interferometers. Thus, we again assume that
the degradation of the fidelity is only due to the imperfect
phase modulation given by Eq. (15), and we presume that the
fidelity of the two density matrices between the two bases is
approximated by the fidelity between the following density
matrices (see Appendix B for the detail):
ρ
(1)
X =
1
2
[
ˆP
( |0z〉 + |1z〉√
2
)
+ ˆP
( |0z〉 − ei|δ||1z〉√
2
)]
,
ρ
(1)
Y =
1
2
[
ˆP
( |0z〉 + iei|δ|/2|1z〉√
2
)
+ ˆP
( |0z〉 − ie−i|δ|/2|1z〉√
2
)]
. (18)
With these parameters, we can express the key generation rate
given Alice and Bob use the X basis as [12]
G = Q(1,1)x
[
1 − h(δ(1,1)′y )]− f (δx)Qxh(δx), (19)
where δ(1,1)′y is the (1,1) version of δ′y in Eq. (10).
To simulate the resulting key generation rate, the bit errors
are assumed to stem from a multiphoton component, the
dark counting, and the misalignment that is assumed to be
proportional to the probability of obtaining the correct bit
values only due to the detection by optical pulses. Like
before, we also assume that all the detectors have the same
characteristics, Alice and Bob choose the intensities of the
signal lights in such a way that the intensities of the incoming
pulses to MU are the same, and all the quantum inefficiencies
of the detectors can be attributed to part of the losses in
the quantum channel. Finally, Alice’s and Bob’s coherent
light sources are assumed to be phase randomized, and the
imperfect phase modulation is represented by the increase of
the alignment error rate. With these assumptions, we may have
the following resulting experimental parameters:
Q(1,1)x = 4αAαBηAηBe−2(αA+αB )
×
[ (1 − pdark)2
2
+ pdark(1 − pdark)
2
2
]
+W (2,1) + W (2,0),
δ(1,1)x = {4αAαBηAηBe−2(αA+αB )pdark(1 − pdark)2/2
+ 2(eali + 4ηex)αAαBηAηBe−2(αA+αB )(1 − pdark)2
+ (W (2,1) + W (2,0))/2}/Q(1,1)x ,
Q(1,1)y = Q(1,1)x ,
δ(1,1)y = δ(1,1)x ,
W (2,1) ≡ 8αAαBe−2(αA+αB )[ηA(1 − ηB) + (1 − ηA)ηB]
×pdark(1 − pdark)2,
W (2,0) ≡ 16αAαB(1 − ηA)(1 − ηB)e−2(αA+αB )
×p2dark(1 − pdark)2,
Qx = 2[1 − (1 − pdark)e−αin ]2(1 − pdark)2e−2αin + V,
δx = V + (eali + 4ηex)2(1 − e−αin )2(1 − pdark)2e−2αin ,
V ≡ pdark(1 − pdark)
2π
∫ 2π
0
dθ
[
1 − (1 − pdark)e−αin|1+eiθ |2
]
× [(1 − pdark)e−αin|1−eiθ |2]+ pdark(1 − pdark)2π
×
∫ 2π
0
dθ
[
1 − (1 − pdark)e−αin|1−eiθ |2
]
× [(1 − pdark)e−αin|1+eiθ |2],
αin ≡ αAηA = αBηB,
ηA = ηdet,A10−ξAlA/10/2,
ηB = ηdet,B10−ξB lB/10/2. (20)
Note that αA (αB) represents each of the intensity of Alice’s
(Bob’s) signal light and the reference light, not the total
intensity of them, and ηA and ηB are divided by 2 since the
conversion efficiency of our converter is 50%. 4 in 4ηex again
comes from the pessimistic assumption that each of Alice’s
and Bob’s phase modulator is imperfect, and W (2,1) (W (2,0))
represents the probability of the event where both Alice and
Bob emit a single photon and only one (zero) photon is detected
but the successful detection event is obtained due to the dark
counting. On the other hand, the quantity that quantifies the
basis-dependent flaw in the present case is upper bounded by
  (1,1)ini
/[Q(1,1)/(4αAαBe−2(αA+αB ))],
Q(1,1) ≡ (Q(1,1)x + Q(1,1)y )/2, (21)
where Q(1,1)/4αAαBe−2(αA+αB ) is the probability that MU
receives a single photon both from Alice and Bob
simultaneously conditioned on that each of Alice and Bob
sends out a single photon. We remark that ini in this scheme
is only dependent on the accuracy of the phase modulation.
This is different from scheme I where the manipulation of the
intensities of the pulses can affect the basis-dependent flaw.
In the simulation, we again assume GYS experimental
parameters and we consider two settings: (a) MU is at Bob’s
side and (b) MU is just in the middle between Alice and
Bob. Note that ini is independent of αA and αB in the phase
encoding scheme II case.
In Fig. 10, we plot the key generation rates of (a) and
(b) for δ = 0, δ = δ0/50, δ = δ0/20, δ = δ0/10 [recall from
Eq. (15) that δ0 ∼ 0.0063224 that corresponds to the typical
extinction ratio of 0.1%], which, respectively, correspond
to F (1) = 1.0, F (1) ∼ 1−1.0 × 10−7, F (1) ∼ 1−6.6 × 10−7,
and F (1) ∼ 1−2.5 × 10−6, and the achievable distances of
(a) and (b) increase with the improvement of the accuracy (i.e.,
with the decrease of δ). We have confirmed that no key can be
distilled in (a) and (b) when δ  δ0/7. The figure shows that the
achievable distance drops significantly with the degradation of
the accuracy of the phase modulator, and the main reason of
this fast decay is that  is approximated by ini/O(ηAηB)
and this dominator decreases exponentially with the increase
of the distance.
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FIG. 10. The key generation rates of each setting as a function
of the distance. (Dashed line) (a) MU is at Bob’s side (i.e., lB = 0).
(Solid line) (b) MU is just in the middle between Alice and Bob. We
plot the key generation rates of each case when δ = 0, δ = δ0/50,
δ = δ0/20, δ = δ0/10 where δ is proportional to the amount of the
phase modulation error, and for each case of (a) and (b) the key
generation rates monotonously increase with the decrease of δ (i.e.,
with the improvement of the phase modulation). The key rates of
(a) and (b) when δ0/10 are almost superposed. See also the main text
for the explanation.
We also plot the corresponding optimalαA in Fig. 11. Notice
that the mean photon number increases in some regime in some
cases of (a), and recall that this increase does not change ini.
If we increased the intensity in scheme I with the distance,
then we would have more basis-dependent flaw, resulting in
shortening of the achievable distance. This may be an intuitive
reason why we see no such increase in Figs. 5, 7, and 9.
Like in the phase encoding scheme I, we investigate the
feasibility of the phase encoding scheme II with the current
technologies by replacing pdark = 8.5 × 10−7, ηdet,A =
ηdet,B = 0.045, and eali = 0.033 with pdark = 1.0 × 10−7,
ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.15 [30], and eali = 0.0075 [9]. With this
upgrade, we have confirmed the impossibility of the key
generation, however, if we double the quantum efficiency of
the detector or equivalently, if we assume the polarization
encoding so that the factor of 1/2, which is introduced by the
phase-to-polarization converter, is removed both from ηA and
ηB in Eq. (20), then we can generate the key, which is shown
in Fig. 12 (also see Fig. 13).
Finally, we note that our simulation is essentially the same
as the polarization coding since the fact that we use phase
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FIG. 11. The optimal mean photon number emitted by Alice (αA)
that outputs Fig. 10. The bold lines correspond to (a). See also the
main text for the explanation.
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FIG. 12. The key generation rates of each setting as a function
of the distance with pdark = 1.0 × 10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.30, and
δ0 = 0.063. Note that we double ηdet,A = ηdet,B compared to the one
of [30], or we effectively consider the polarization encoding [9].
(Dashed line) (a) MU is at Bob’s side (i.e., lB = 0). (Solid line)
(b) MU is just in the middle between Alice and Bob. The key rates
are almost superposed. See also the main text for the explanation.
encoding is only reflected by the dominator of 2 in ηA and
ηB in Eq. (20). Thus, the behavior of the key generation rate
against the degradation of the state preparation is the same
also in polarization-based MDIQKD. Also note that even in
the standard BB84,  decays exponentially with increasing
distance. Thus, we conclude that very precise state preparation
is very crucial in the security of not only MDIQKD but
also in standard QKD. We also note that our estimation of
the fidelity might be too pessimistic since we have assumed
that the degradation of the extinction ratio is only due to
imperfect phase modulation. In reality, the imperfection of
Mach-Zehnder interferometer and other imperfections should
contribute to the degradation, and the fidelity should be closer
to 1 than the one based on our model.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we have proposed two phase encoding
MDIQKD schemes. The first scheme is based on the phase
locking technique and the other one is based on the conversion
of the pulses in the standard phase encoding BB84 to
polarization modes. We proved the security of the first scheme,
which intrinsically possesses a basis-dependent flaw, as well as
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FIG. 13. The optimal mean photon number emitted by Alice (αA)
that outputs Fig. 12. The bold lines correspond to (a). See also the
main text for the explanation.
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the second scheme with the assumption of the basis-dependent
flaw in the single-photon part of the pulses. Based on the
security proof, we also evaluate the effect of imperfect state
preparation, and especially we focus our attention to the
imperfect phase modulation.
While the first scheme can cover relatively short distances
of the key generation, this scheme has an advantage that the
basis-dependent flaw can be controlled by the intensities of
the pulses. Thanks to this property, we have confirmed based
on a simple model that 3 or 5 times the improvement in the
accuracy of the phase modulation is enough to generate the
key. Moreover, we have confirmed that the key generation is
possible even without these improvements if we implement
this scheme by using the up-to-date technologies and the
control of intensities of the laser source is precise. On the
other hand, it is not so clear to us how accurate we can lock
the phase of two spatially separated laser sources, which is
important for the performance of scheme I. Our result still
implies that scheme I can tolerate up to some extent the
imperfect phase locking errors, which should be basically
the same as the misalignment errors, but further analysis of
the accuracy from the experimental viewpoint is necessary.
We leave this problem for future studies.
The second scheme can cover much longer distances when
the fidelity of the single-photon components of the Y -basis
and X-basis density matrices is perfect or extremely close
to perfect. When we consider the slight degradations of the
fidelity, however, we find that the achievable distances drop
significantly. This suggests that we need a photon source with
a very high fidelity, and very accurate estimation of the fidelity
of the single-photon subspace is also indispensable.
In our estimation of the imperfection of the phase modula-
tion, we simply assume that the degradation of the extinction
ratio is only due to imperfect phase modulation, which
might be too pessimistic, and the imperfection of the Mach-
Zehnder interferometer and other imperfections contribute to
the degradation. Thus, the actual fidelity between the density
matrices of the single-photon part in two bases might be very
close to 1, which should be experimentally confirmed for the
secure communication. We note that the use of the passive
device to prepare the state [32] may be a promising way for
the very accurate state preparation.
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FIG. 14. The key generation rates of the standard BB84 with
infinite decoy states from the X basis when δ = 0, δ = δ0, δ = 2δ0
where δ is the amount of the phase modulation error.
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FIG. 15. The optimal mean photon number emitted by Alice (αA)
that outputs Fig. 14.
We remark that the accurate preparation of the state is
very important not only in MDIQKD but also in standard
QKD where Eve can enhance the imbalance of the quantum
coin exponentially with the increase of the distance. To see
this point, we, respectively, plot in Figs. 14 and 15 the key
generation rate of standard BB84 with infinite decoy states
in the X basis and its optimal mean photon number as-
suming pdark = 1.0 × 10−7, ηdet,A = 0.15 [30], eali = 0.0075,
f (δx) = 1.22, and ξ = 0.21. Again, δ0 ∼ 0.063 is the typical
value of the phase modulation error, and we see in the figure
that the degradation of the phase modulator in terms of the
accuracy significantly decreases the achievable distance of
secure key generation. One notices that standard decoy BB84
is more robust against the degradation since the probability
that the measurement outcome of the quantum coin along the
X basis is |1x〉 given the successful detection of the signal
by Bob is written as ini = 12 (1 − F (1)A ) rather than ini =
1
2 (1 − F (1)A F (1)B ). On the other hand, one has to remember that
we trust the operation of Bob’s detectors in this simulation,
which may not hold in practice.
Finally, we neglect the effect of the fluctuation of the
intensity and the center frequency of the laser light in our
study, which we will analyze in future works. In summary, our
work highlights the importance of very accurate preparation
of the states to avoid basis-dependent flaws.
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APPENDIX A: SCHEME I WITHOUT NOISES AND LOSSES
In this Appendix, we give a detailed calculation about how
scheme I works when there are no channel losses and noises.
In order to calculate the joint probability that Alice and Bob
obtain the type-0 successful event, where only the detector
D0 clicks, and they share the maximally entangled state
|+〉, we introduce a projector ˆD0 ≡ ˆP (|0〉D0 ) ˆP (|0〉D1 ) that
corresponds to the type-0 successful event. Here, 0 represents
the nonvacuum state. The state after Alice and Bob have the
type-0 successful event ˆD0 |ζ 〉A1,B1,D0,D1 [see Eq. (2) for the
definition of |ζ 〉A1,B1,D0,D1] can be expressed by
ˆ1A1,B1 ˆD0 |ζ 〉A1,B1,D0,D1 =
a√
2
|+〉A1,B1|φ0〉D0|0〉D1
+ b√
2
|+〉A1,B1|φ1〉D0|0〉D1.
(A1)
Here, ˆ1A1,B1 is an identity operator on A1 and B1, a and b are
complex numbers, and |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are orthonormal bases,
which are related with each other through
ˆP (|0〉)|
√
2α′〉 ≡ a|φ0〉 + b|φ1〉, (A2)
ˆP (|0〉)| −
√
2α′〉 ≡ a|φ0〉 − b|φ1〉.
By a direct calculation, one can show that
|a|2 = (1 − e
−2α′ )2
2
,
(A3)
|b|2 = (1 − e
−4α′ )
2
.
Finally, by taking the partial trace over the system D0 and D1
in Eq. (A1), we can see that Alice and Bob share either |+〉
or |+〉 probabilistically, and the joint probability that they
obtain the type-0 successful event and share the maximally
entangled state |+〉 is given by |b|2/2. In the same manner,
we can readily calculate the other joint probabilities.
APPENDIX B: IMPERFECTION
OF THE PHASE MODULATOR
In this Appendix, we give an estimation of the fidelity
between the density matrices in the X and Y bases by using
the extinction ratio. In this estimation, we assume that the
source of the imperfections is only due to the imperfect phase
modulation and the stability of the intensity control of the
coherent light source is negligible.
Imagine that we generate two pulses, one of which is the
reference light and the other one of which is the signal light,
and these pulses are spatially separated. Then, we input these
pulses into a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, which is composed
of two 50:50 beam splitters, and the output from one of the
two output ports gives us the desired state and the other output
port gives a wrong state. Let T and t be transmission rates
of the pulses to the correct port and the wrong port, which
satisfies
T + t = 1, ηex ≡ t
T
, (B1)
where ηex is the extinction ratio. In typical experiments, ηex is
in the order of 10−3 [29]. We assume that the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer is perfect and the imperfection of the extinction
ratio is only due to imperfect phase modulations.
Now, suppose that we plug |√α〉 and |ei(π+δ)√α〉 into the
perfect Mach-Zehnder interferometer, where δ represents the
imperfect phase modulation when we want to apply the phase
shift ofπ . Since the Mach-Zehnder interferometer is composed
of 50:50 beam splitters, ηex can be represented by | tan δ2 |2,
and thus we can obtain the imperfection of δ by solving the
following equation:
∣∣∣∣tan δ2
∣∣∣∣
2
= ηex. (B2)
For instance, when ηex = 10−3, we have |δ| ∼ 0.063 ≡ δ0
that is equivalent to about 3.62◦. We rely on this equation
to estimate the accuracy of the phase modulator, and we
assume that the actual phase modulation is θ + |δ|θ/π (i.e.,
the degree of the imperfect phase modulation is proportional
to the desired phase modulation. We remark that 3.62◦ seems
rather large to us, and we believe that this can be substantially
improved through careful calibration and/or engineering of the
preparation process.
In the case of scheme I, the ideal density matrix for the
X basis ρ(Ideal)X is (|α〉〈α| + |−α〉〈−α|)/2 and the one for the
Y basis ρ(Ideal)Y is (|iα〉〈iα| + |−iα〉〈−iα|)/2. Based on our
imperfect phase modulation model, we have the density matrix
for the actually generated states in the X basis as
ρ
(Act)
X (α,δ) = (|
√
α〉〈√α| + |−eiδ√α〉〈−eiδ√α|)/2, (B3)
and the one for the Y basis as
ρ
(Act)
Y (α,δ) = (|iei|δ|/2
√
α〉〈iei|δ|/2√α|
+ |−ie−i|δ|/2√α〉〈−ie−i|δ|/2√α|)/2. (B4)
Here, note that when we want to prepare |√α〉, we do not
apply any phase modulation.
In the case of scheme II, the ideal single-photon density
matrix for the X basis ρ(Ideal,1)X is (|0x〉〈0x | + |1x〉〈1x |)/2 and
the one for the Y basis ρ(Ideal,1)Y is (|0y〉〈0y | + |1y〉〈1y |)/2.
With the assumption on the accuracy of the phase modulator,
we have the density matrix for the actually generated states in
the X basis as
ρ
(Act,1)
X = ( ˆP [(|0z〉 + |1z〉)/
√
2]
+ ˆP [(|0z〉 − ei|δ||1z〉)/
√
2])/2, (B5)
and the one for the Y basis as
ρ
(Act,1)
Y = ( ˆP [(|0z〉 + iei|δ|/2|1z〉)/
√
2]
+ ˆP [(|0z〉 − ie−i|δ|/2|1z〉)/
√
2])/2. (B6)
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